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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are not in dispute. They are stipulated (2 Stipulations Tr. 5, 10). The statement
contained 1n appellant's brief is substantially correct.
ARGUMENT
The ultimate question for determination is: Did
respondent become the owner of the dividends immediately when they were declared? If respondent
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was the owner of the 800 shares of stock, even though
she had not had them transferred to her name on the
books of the company, and if the ownership of the
shares carried with it the ownership of the dividends
declared thereon, then appellant was not justified in
paying them to Leary.
(a) RESPONDENT OWNED THE 800 SHARES
WHEN THE DIVIDENDS WERE DECLARED.
It was stipulated and the Findings recite:
"* * * That on or about the lOth day of
June, 19 3 1, * * * Margaret T. Donovan was,
and for a long time prior thereto had been, residing with the plaintiff in the city of Pittsburgh, and that on or about said date said
Margaret ·T. Donovan had in her possession
certain certificates of stock in several oil and
mining companies, among which certificates
were certificates numbered 2011 to 2018 aggregating 800 shares of stock issued by the defendant company in the name of James H. Dalziel and endorsed by him. * * * That on or
about the lOth day of June, 1931, ***Margaret T. Donovan made actual delivery of all
of said stock certificates to respondent with the
remark in substance and effect: 'Mary, I want
you to have these certificates. They are yours.
I understand that they are of no value now,
but they may be of value to you some day.'
That the plaintiff accepted said certificates and
kept them with other of her personal papers
until on or about the 15th day of June, 1951/'
* * * (Tr. 6-7.)
The dividends, (including the payment of the
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interest-bearing notes), were declared as follows:
· Dec. 18, 1948-$2.50 per share (interest-bearing notes).
Dec. 18, 1948-$1.00 per share.
Dec. 10, 1949-$0.25 per share.
Sept. 15, 1950-$0.25 per share.
A total of $4.00 per share on 800 shares$3,200.00. (Tr. 6.)
It was further stipulated and found that the
said shares of stock were at all times in the exclusive
possession of respondent under claim of ownership by
her from about the lOth day of June, 1931, until
they were delivered to the brokerage firm of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner ~ Beane, at their St. Petersburg, Florida, office on or about the 15th day of
June, 1951, and on or about the 27th day of
June, 19 51, said stock certificates were sold by said
brokerage firm and respondent received the full proceeds of the sale thereof, less the brokerage commission.
After the sale, said certificates were pre sen ted to the
appellant by the purchasers thereof and were transferred to said purchasers on the books and records
of the appellant company and new certificates issued
in lieu thereof. ( T r. 7. )
From Mrs. Do.novan' s possession of the endorsed
certificates a presumption of ownership attached, and
a determination of the question of ownership must be
according to the presumption unless controverted by
competent evidence. United States Supply Company
v. Gillespie (Okla.), 16 6 Pacific. 13 9; Park v. Grady
(Mont.), 204 Pac. 382; Tracy v. Juanto (Ore.),
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205 Pac. 822; Hogg v. Eckhardt (111.), 175 N. E.
382; Williams v. Gray (Mont.), 203 Pac. 524; Cof~
fin v. Hyde (Idaho), 205 Pac. 736; Feehan v. Ken~
drick (Idaho), 179 Pac. 507; an~ Tobias v. Mining
Company (Idaho), 17 Pac. (2d) 338.
Mrs. Donovan accompanied the actual deliv~
ery of the certificates to respondent with the words:
"Mary, I want you to have these certificates. They
are yours. I understand that they are of no value
now, but they may be of value to you some day."
(Tr. 7.)
Mrs. Donovan had been living with her daugh~
ter for some time previous to this transaction, and
whether there was some consideration (such as serv~
ices rendered) for the delivery of the stock does not
appear. However, the transaction constituted a valid
gift.
In Vandor v. Roach (Cal.), 15 Pac. 354, the
words, ''These bonds are for you,'' were held suf ~
ficient evidence of a gift. Said the court:
Hit is argued that what was done did not
show sufficient intention of giving. The Counsel says that 'the operative words of a gift are:
"I give" or ''I have given" '; and that these
vvords are wanting. But we do not think that
any formula or set phrase is necessary. It is
sufficient if there was delivery, and any words
importing an intention to give. The only evi~
dence on the subject was that of the physician,
who testified that the dying man took a package from under his pillow, and handed it to the
plaintiff, saying: 'These bonds are for you.
t
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The witness did not pretend to give the precise
words uttered, but stated that this was the substance of what was said. This, we think, was
sufficient manifestation of intention to give."
In Coffin v. Hyde, supra, the court uses this language:
''It has been held that the test of an effectual gift is that the transfer was such that, in
conjunction with the donative intention, it
completely stripped the donor of his dominion
of the thing given (Cook v. Lum, 55 N. J.
Law, 3 73, 26 Atl. 803), and, in the absence of
explanatory or contradictory evidence, the possession by the donee of an instrument transferring the title to the property to him is sufficient to raise the intent that it should take effect according to its terms. It is apparent,
therefore, in this case, that the decedent intended to confer on respondent ownership of the
property here involved, that he proceeded to
do so by executing and delivering to respondent
a bill of sale to the property, and that the gift
was therefore complete. As is said in Sharpe v.
Sh~arpe, supra:
'' 'Gifts causa mortis are older than the
republic; and, if they be satisfactorily proven,
it is the duty of the court to give effect to
th em. ' ''
From her possession of the certificates it is presumed that respondent was a bona fide holder. As
stated in Feehan v. Ken,drick, supra:
''Possessors of certificates of stock are,
prima facie, presumed to be bona fide holders,
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and it was incumbent upon appellant to allege that respondent was not a holder, in good
faith, without notice of the fraud charged."
And in Tobias v. Mining Company, supra, it is
said:
"It is clear from C. S. 4730, that the
shares of stock in question were subject to be
transferred by indorsement of the certificates by
the signature of the proprietor and delivery
thereof. The certificates in question were indorsed by the signature of McConnell, the proprietor, properly witnessed, in favor of respondent, her name being written in the indorsements, and the same were in her possession,
which at least raised a presumption of delivery and rightful possession and that the instruments of transfer should take effect according
to their terms.''
Our statute, section 16-3-1, provides:
''Exclusive manner of transfer.-Title to
a certificate and to the shares represented thereby can be transferred only:
" ( 1) By delivery of the certificate indorsed either in blank or to a specified person
by the person appearing by the certificate to
be the owner of the shares represented thereby.
(Italics ours) .

* * * *
''The provisions of this section shall be
applicable although the charter or articles of
incorporation or code of regulations or by-laws
of the corporation issuing the certificate and
the certificate itself provide that the shares repSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7

resented thereby shall be transferrable only on
the books of the corporation or shall be registered by a registrar or transferred by a transfer agent.''
This court has held that there is no longer any
question as to the validity of transfer by mere endorsement and delivery of the certificate even before
the adoption of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act.
Brown v. Wright, 48 Utah 633, 161 Pac. 448.
Appellant is in no better position to question
respondent's title to the shares than if she, at any
time, after receiving them, had presented the same to
the appellant for transfer. As a matter of fact, appellant did recognize her title by transferring the
shares upon presentation thereof by the purchasers.
Title to the shares became vested in plaintiff by one
of the exclusive methods prescribed by the statute,
and the argument of counsel that, according to the
by-laws of appellant:
''transfers of stock shall be made on the books
of the corporation only by the person named
in the certificate or by an attorney lawfully
consituted in writing, and upon surrender and
cancellation of the certificate therefor." (See
appellant's Brief, pp. 5 and 9).
has no weight as affecting respondent's title to the
stock, in face of the statute.
In First National Bank v. Stribling (Okla.) 86
Pac. 512, it is held that shares of stock in a corporation organized under the laws of the territory of
Oklahoma are personal property, and may be transSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ferred by indorsement and delivery of the certificate;
and where such shares of stock, when issued, provide that they are transferable on the books of the
corporation only on surrender of the certificate, such
provision is binding upon the corporation, and it cannot reissue such stock without the surrender of the
original certificate to any person other than the person in whose name they stand on the books of the
company, and thereby escape liability to a person
who holds su.:h stock by assignment and delivery of
the same. Such reissued stock is fraudulent and void
as against the rights of the bona fide holder of the
original.
Mrs. Donovan made delivery to respondent under such circumstances as to constitute a gift, and the
transfer was made in accordance with the statute and
in accordance with the authorities that an indorsed
certificate passes title by delivery.
Sees. 16-3-5, Utah Code Ann., 1953, provides:
"The delivery of a certificate to transfer
title in accordance with the provisions of Section 16-3-1 is effectual, except as provided in
Section 16-3-7, though made by one having no
right of possession and having no authority
from the owner of the certificate or from the
person purporting to transfer the title.n (Italics ours.)
·1 herefore, even if Mrs. Donovan had no right
of possession, her delivery of the certificates was sufficient to transfer the title to respondent, for it was .
not within the exceptions specified in Sec. 16-3-7.
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Appellant at all times knew, of course, that said
certificates were outstanding, and when Leary
claimed ownership, appellant was so apprehensive
that the certificates might, at any time, be presented
by someone who had succeeded to Dalziel's title that
it required from Leary a bond indemnifying appellant against all loss, damage or expense which it
might suffer or sustain in the event these certificates
should be presented; and Leary furnished such a bond.
(Tr. 10.)
In First N ationa! Bank v. Stribling (Okla.) 8 6
Pac. 516, it is said:
"It is true that the holder could not assert,
as against the corporation, any right under it
except the right to have the transfer noted on
the books of the corporation until it was so
noted. But the holder is the only person who
can demand such notation of transfer, and this
he may do upon surrender of the certificate, and
is not limited in time to do so. Any attempt
on the part of the transferrer, in this case Stribling, to secure a transfer of the stock on the
books of the company in any name but that of
the transferee, is an attempted fraud, if successful is a fraud, and the corporation acting in
violation of its agreement not to transfer, except on surrender of the certificate, must be
held to be a party to it. The bond required
and taken by the company before it would consent to a reissue of the stock in no way relieves it from the consequences of its fraudulent act; but is, on the other. hand, a confession that it was violating its obligation not to
transfer its stock except on surrender of the certificate. * * *''
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It further appears from the stipulated facts that
after appellant had recognized the validity of the old
certificates, and the validity of the claim of ownership by the purchasers from respondent, and had issued to said purchasers new certificates, appellant
made demand upon Leary for the return of the new
certificates which had been issued to him. Upon his
refusal to make return thereof, appellant went into the
market and bought 800 shares for cancelation so as
to remedy an over-issue, and then sued the bond company for reimbursement, and the .bond company responded by the payment to appellant of $11,240.00.
(Tr. 11.) Appellant then issued to the surety company a partial release, but expressly provided that it
would not be released or discharged from liability on
any claim which might thereafter be made on account
of the payment of the dividends to Leary after the
new certificates had been issued to him, but which
had been declared while respondent was the owner and
in possssion of the original certificates. (Tr. 11.)
(b)

RIGHT TO DIVIDEND FOLLOWED OWNERSHIP OF STOCK.

In view of the fact that respondent owned the
certificates when the dividends were declared; that appellant recognized her ownership by recognizing the
validity of her sale of the certificates, why should it
not recognize her claim to the dividends? Counsel
argues that the company is protected by paying the
dividends to stockholders of record, but these dividends were not declared on the stock which was issued to Leary. They were declared on the particuSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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lar certificates in the possession of, and owned by, respondent. Immediately when these dividends were.
declared, respondent, as owner of the certificates, became vested with title to the dividends.
In Clarke v. Campbell, 23 Utah 569, 65 Pac.
496, defendant deposited in escrow certain shares of
stock to be delivered to Clarke upon payment of
$75,000.00. While said shares were in escrow, certain dividends amounting to $19,000.00 were declared thereon. Clarke paid for the stock as agreed,
and then claimed the dividends. The court held:
"Dividends declared on corporation stock
belong to the persons owning the stock at the
time the dividends were declared."
In Western Securities Co. v. Mining Company,
57 Utah 88, 192 Pac. 664, the court declares:
''The general rule, so far as we know, in
the absence of a statute to the contrary, which
is enforced by the courts, is that the dividends
belong to the stockholder who owns the stock
at the time the dividend is declared, and, although he parts with his stock after the dividend is declared and before it is paid, he nevertheless is entitled thereto unless he has assigned or disposed of the dividend with the
stock or independently thereof. The mere sale
and transfer of the certificates of stock after a
dividend is declared does not carry with it the
dividend. One of the cases to which frequent
references is made in the decisions is the case
of Hopper v. Sage, 112 N. Y. 530, 20 N. E.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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350, 8 Am. St. Rep. 771.
opinion it is said:

In the course of the

·' 'The declaration of the dividend is in
legal contemplation a separation of the amount
thereof from the assets of the corporation,
which holds such amount thereafter as the
trustee of the stockholder at the time of the
declaration of the dividend. In the absence,
therefore, of any provision in a contract of sale
and purchase of stock, outside of and not subject to the rules of the Stock Exchange, the
law declares that such a contract gives the dividends to the owner of the shares when the dividends were declared.' "
In First National Bank v. Glenn, 36 Fed. Sup.
5 52, it is held:
~·The

declaration of a dividend by a corporation creates between the corporation and
the stockholder a 'debtor and creditor relationship' instanter regardless of the fact that payment is not to be made until a later date."
In Fletcher on Corporations, Vol. II, pages 6566, it is said:
"In preceding sections it is pointed out
that a stockholder is one who owns stock in a
corporation, and that a certificate of stock is
not the stock itself, but merely the written evidence of the stockholder's rights as such. It
is a necessary conclusion therefrom that issuance of a certificate of stock is not necessary
to make one a stockholde-r * * * and although
he may have no certificate, he is entitled
to all the rights and is subject to all the
liabilities of a stockholde-r.''
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In support of this statement are cited cases
from 3 2 states.
Counsel refers to the fact that respondent abandoned her claim to dividends declared and paid to Hallinan on the 200 shares standing in his name. Of
course, a corporation is protected in the payment of
dividends to those who are stockholders of record at the
time the dividend is declared if it has no knowledge
of any endorsement or transfer of the shares, and if
payment had been made to Dalziel without notice to
the company of his indorsement of the stock and
its possession by the respondent, respondent's remedy
would have been against Dalziel; but no payment was
made of respondent's money to Dalziel as had been
done in the case of Hallinan. Why should appellant be permitted to escape liability to respondent for
wrongfully giving her money away when it protected itself by bond against its wrongful act, and
when it knew that it would be obligated to answer
to the owner of the original certificates if, as was
the case, Leary's claim that he was the owner and that
the certificates were lost, was false?
The case of Mahoning Railroad Co. v. Robbins,
et al., 35 Ohio State Rep. 483, upon which counsel
relies, is, so far as the question of dividends is concerned, directly at variance with the decisions of this
and other courts which hold that the right to clivi. dends follows the ownership of the stock.
(c)

1.

SUMMARY.

Mrs. Donovan was prima facie the owner
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of the shares in June, 19 31 ; the certificates being
endorsed by Dalziel and in her possession.
2. Respondent be-came owner by gift and delivery from her mother, Mrs. Donovan.
3. Respondent had sole possession of and
owned the certificates from June, 1931 until June,
1951.
4. The dividends sued for were declared, while
respondent owned the shares, and when declared, instanter became the property of respondent.
5. Appellant could not relieve itself of liability from respondent by paying her money to Leary
simply because he claimed to be owner of the shares,
when his claim was without foundation.
6. The dividends were declared on respondent's
shares, not on the shares which were erroneous! y issued to Leary.
7. The assignment to Leary by Mrs. Dalziel
~ave him no right to the shares or the dividends, because Mrs. Dalziel had no interest therein which could
be transferred.
8. Under Utah Statute, no provision of appellant's by-laws requiring shares to be transferred
on the books of the company could affect or impair
respondent's title to the shares and her right to the
dividends.
The judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
JESSE

R.

s.

BUDGE,

Attorney for Respondent.
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